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Case No. 890257-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1978). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989), 
as the appeal was transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme 
Court on May 2, 1989. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
1. Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103 (1978), 
2. Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1978), 
3. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1978), 
4. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978). 
Copies of these provisions are contained in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict convicting defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Joanne Odom, was charged with aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-302 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery on April 
27, 1988, following a jury trial, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
John A. Rokich, Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by 
Judge Rokich on September 23, 1988, to five years to life at the 
Utah State Penitentiary. 
An appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme Court. On 
May 2, 1989, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this 
Court for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 4, 1988, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Paul 
Kogen entered the Continental Bank and Trust Company located at 
2100 East 7000 South in Salt Lake City (T. at 7-8, 22, 38). Just 
prior to his entering the bank, Lisa Gitlan, a bank employee 
operating the drive-up window, observed Kogen "walking along the 
walk in front of the branch", then turn into the bank 
(T. at 38, 45). Kogen was wearing a hooded royal blue jogging 
outfit, ski goggles, a scarf over his nose and mouth, and white 
gloves. The hood was pulled over his head, and his hair was 
tucked back in. Kogen was also brandishing a small automatic 
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pistol, which was covered by a white cloth (T. at 8-9, 13, 17, 
23-24, 38, 46, 57-59). 
Upon entering the bank, Kogen first approached bank 
teller Wendy Gren, and pointing the pistol directly at her, 
exclaimed, "This is a bank robbery; give me your money" 
(T. at 8, 18, 38). Gren complied, handing over numerous bills, 
including her "bank money" and "red dye pack" (T. at 9-10). The 
dye pack is basically wrapped money, with bills on top and bottom 
and in between a "red dye pack" that is automatically detonated 
30-45 seconds after it is taken through the doors of the bank 
(T. at 10, 14). The "bank money", also referred to as "bait 
money", triggers a silent alarm and engages surveillance cameras 
when removed from the till (T. at 10). 
Kogen, with some difficulty, placed the money inside a 
plastic grocery sack, then moved down to a second teller, Linda 
Romrell, and made a similar demand (T. at 11, 19, 28, 39, 58). 
After obtaining money from both tellers, Kogen exited the bank 
(T. at 11, 29. 40, 58). The robbery took approximately two to 
four minutes (T. at 12, 47). 
Kogen "ran" to a four-door black Volvo parked 
approximately twenty to thirty yards from the bank and entered 
the passenger side (T. at 40-41, 49-50, 59). Driving the black 
Volvo was defendant, Joanne Odom (T. at 120). Shortly after 
pulling away from the bank, at a distance of approximately one 
hundred yards, and directly in front of an Albertson's grocery 
store, the "red-dye pack" exploded (T. at 41-43, 52). 
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Several witnesses inside the bank had watched Kogen 
enter the black Volvo and the explosion shortly thereafter 
(T. at 20-21, 32-34, 40-43-, 49, 59-60, 69-70). Martin Curtis, a 
bank customer, followed Kogen as he exited the bank, attempting 
to obtain the license number of the black Volvo (T. at 66). 
Curtis followed Kogen to a distance of approximately "20 feet 
from where the car stalled" (T. at 66, 69). Curtis observed 
Kogen raise the hood of the car, while defendant exited from "the 
driver's side of the car, and . . . left the driver's door open 
and got out and stood there and looked under the hood at him 
[Kogen] trying to figure out what the problem was" (T. at 42-43, 
59-60, 69). Upon starting the car, Kogen "slammed the hood down" 
and "ran across the front of the car and jumped in the driver's 
side and told her [defendant] to get in, and she ran across and 
jumped in the passenger side, and then they left" (T. at 60-61). 
Another witness, Dale Ambrose, a bag-boy for 
Albertsons, observed the commotion from a short distance as he 
was helping a customer with her groceries (T. at 75, 79). 
Ambrose testified that both defendant and Kogen jumped from the 
black Volvo and attempted to remove the "red-dye" dust (T. at 75-
76). Defendant opened three of the doors and Kogen one (T. at 
80). Ambrose then heard Kogen say, "Hey, you - hurry. Get in. 
Get in the car. Hurry before witnesses see us" (T. at 62-63, 
76). Kogen then entered the driver's side and defendant entered 
the passenger side (T. at 70). As the car pulled away, a 
temporary license plate sticker "flew" out the window (T. at 82). 
Ambrose recovered the sticker, and turned it into police (T. at 
76, 82, 84-85). 
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Police ran a trace of the license number on the sticker 
which showed the car to be registered to Paul Kogen of 1445 
Winterwood Circle in Sandy (T. at 85). Police immediately went 
to that address where they found and arrested both defendant and 
Kogen. Following their arrest, both defendant and Kogen were 
taken back to the robbery scene and subsequently identified by 
several witnesses (T. at 62, 85-86, 90, 99-100). Defendant was 
then taken to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice where she was 
interviewed (T. at 86). 
Prior to being interviewed, defendant was apprised of 
her rights, after which she voluntarily agreed to talk 
(T. at 91-92). During a tape recorded interview with Deputy 
Sheriff Manfred Lassig, of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, 
defendant gave the following account of events with regard to the 
bank robbery (T. at 102). Defendant indicated that she was not 
involved in the bank robbery and only became aware of it after it 
had occurred (T. at 93). She said that she had been waiting in 
front of the Albertson's store when Kogen drove up. Kogen had 
dropped her off a few minutes before and had indicated that he 
was "going over to take a look at the bank" (T. at 95-96). When 
he returned and as she was about to enter the car, she noticed 
some red dye in the vehicle (defendant denied being in the 
vehicle when the "red-dye pack" exploded, T. at 103). After 
noticing the red dye, defendant no longer wished to go with 
Kogen, but only wanted to recover her purse and "stuff" inside 
(T. at 93-94). After a few moments, defendant entered the car 
and the two drove to 1445 Winterwood Circle, stopping along the 
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way at a 7-Eleven convenience store to purchase a drink (T. at 
95). Defendant further told police that she knew Kogen had been 
involved in another robbery sometime prior to the robbery on 
February 4, 1989 (T. at 95, 141). Following the interview, 
defendant was charged with aggravated robbery (T. at 97). 
At trial, defendant admitted lying to police during the 
recorded interview given after she was arrested (T. at 131-132, 
137-139). Defendant testified that she had known Kogen for a 
period of two years and had lived with him for approximately six 
months at his home at 1445 Winterwood Circle in Sandy (T. at 117-
118). She said that on February 4, 1988, she drove Kogen to the 
Continental Bank and Trust, believing that he was going to cash a 
check he had received from drug buyers. When she dropped him off 
"right in the front of the front doors" (T. at 120, 121, 145), 
she did not notice him wearing or having in his possession the 
ski goggles, scarf, gun, or plastic sack used during the robbery 
(T. at 122, 139-140). Defendant testified she left Kogen at the 
bank and went to the Albertson's store nearby to purchase 
cigarettes (T. at 120-121). A few minutes later she returned to 
the bank, observed Kogen "walking out" of the bank and entering 
the car (T. at 121). Again, defendant indicated she did not 
notice "anything unusual" (i.e. ski goggles) except that Kogen 
was now carrying a plastic grocery sack containing money and a 
gun (T. at 122). When Kogen entered the car he exclaimed, "Just 
hurry and go, hurry and go," and, sometime thereafter, indicated 
he had robbed the bank (T. at 123). Defendant complied with the 
order to drive away and, moments later, "a bomb blew up" ("red-
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dye pack") (T. at 123). Defendant testified that "smoke started 
coming out, and he [Kogen] was freaking out . . . . He was 
throwing things off his lap and throwing things off the back 
seat" (T. at 123-124). Defendant then stopped the car and 
attempted to leave, but was forced by Kogen to get back in the 
car and to lie down on the back seat (T. at 124). Kogen opened 
the car doors to clear the red dye dust (T. at 124). He then 
drove to a 7-Eleven where defendant purchased a drink. Defendant 
neither fled nor attempted to phone police. Defendant and Kogen 
then went to Kogen's residence at 1445 Winterwood Circle in Sandy 
where they were arrested shortly thereafter (T. at 125-126). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial and the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom were sufficient to convict defendant 
of aggravated robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT 
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to 
convict her of aggravated robbery. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the 
standard of review on appeal when the argument concerns 
sufficiency of the evidence. The Court accords great deference 
to the jury verdict. It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. M[T]he 'Court should only interfere when . . . 
reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
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reasonable doubt.'" State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 
App. 1987) (quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 
1980)). Furthermore, defendant has the burden of establishing 
-that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime." State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 
1161, 1168 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Walker, 765 P.2d 874 
(Utah 1988); State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). 
All of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn 
from the evidence should be reviewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury verdict. When the evidence is so viewed, the Court 
reverses only when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt concerning defendant's guilt. See State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); accord e.g., State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 593 
(Utah 1988); State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231 (Utah 1987). The 
Court has succinctly stated that, unless there is a clear showing 
of a lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld. See 
Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412; State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814 
(Utah 1977). 
The statutory requirements of robbery and aggravated 
robbery, as provided by Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-301 and 76-6-302 
(1978), are as follows: 
76-6-301 Robbery.—(1) Robbery is the 
unlawful and intentional taking of personal 
property in the possession of another from 
his person, or immediate presence, against 
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his will, accomplished by means of force or 
fear. 
76-6-302 Aggravated Robbery.—(1) A person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the course 
of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or 
a deadly weapon; 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978) provides; 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he standard for 
determining whether an individual is an accomplice to a crime is 
whether that individual could be charged with the same offense as 
the defendant." State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah 1985) 
(footnote omitted); see also State v. Berg, 613 P.2d 1125, 1126 
(Utah 1980); State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977). 
In the present case the evidence conclusively 
established, and defendant conceded, that she drove Kogen to the 
bank where the aggravated robbery occurred, and drove and 
accompanied Kogen as he fled therefrom. The only issue raised by 
§ 76-6-302 was recently amended, effective April 24, 1989, 
and now provides in pertinent part: 
Aggravated Robbery.—(1) A person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses or threatens to use a deadly 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) (Supp. 1989). 
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defendant on appeal is whether there exists sufficient evidence 
to establish whether defendant had the requisite mental state for 
the commission of the crime. 
As indicated above, robbery requires an "intentional" 
taking. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (1978) provides in pertinent 
part: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
• • • 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800 (Utah 
1979), stated: 
Specific intent need not be proved by direct 
evidence, and of course, is always subject to 
denial by an accused. The fact finder, 
however, is entitled to draw all reasonable 
inferences from the facts and from the 
actions of the defendant. 
Id. at 802 (emphasis added); see also State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
1071 (Utah 1989); State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 453 P.2d 696 (Utah 1969).2 
In Peterson the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is true that the State was unable to prove 
directly what was in the defendant's mind 
relative to doing harm to the victim; and 
that he in fact denied any such intent. 
However, his version does not establish the 
fact, nor does it even necessarily raise 
sufficient doubt to vitiate the conviction. 
If it were so, it would lie within the power 
of a defendant to defeat practically any 
conviction which depended upon his state of 
mind. As against what he says, it is the 
jury's privilege to weigh and consider all of 
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In the present case, defendant's requisite intent was 
clearly established at trial through the evidence presented, and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, including the express 
actions and conduct of defendant herself. 
First, defendant testified that when she dropped off 
Kogen "right in the front of the front doors of the bank," she 
believed he was only going to cash a check, and she did not 
notice him wearing or having in his possession the ski goggles, 
scarf, gun or plastic sack used in the robbery (T. at 120-122, 
139-140, 145). Defendant's claim would have to be considered 
very questionable since bank teller Lisa Gitlan testified that 
she observed Kogen wearing and/or having possession of these 
items prior to entering the bank while he was "walking along the 
walk in front of the branch" (T. at 38, 45). It could have been 
only a matter of seconds between the time Kogen exited the car, 
until he was initially observed by Gitlan. This would tend to 
show that Kogen was disguised with or had possession of the above 
items at the time he left the car. If Kogen was wearing or had 
possession of the items used in the crime prior to exiting the 
car, this may not only discredit the testimony of defendant, but 
would also be strong evidence that she was aware of and aided 
2 
Cont. the other facts and circumstances 
shown in evidence in determining what they 
will believe. This includes not only what 
was said and what was done, but also drawing 
reasonable inferences from the conduct shown, 
. . . . This is in accord with the 
elementary rule that a person is presumed to 
intend the natural and probable consequences 
of his acts. 
State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d at 697 (footnotes omitted). 
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Kogen in the commission of the crime. In addition, relevant to 
defendant's knowledge, the evidence showed that defendant knew 
Kogen had committed a separate robbery prior to February 4, 1988 
(T. at 95, 141) . 
Second, defendant testified that after dropping 
defendant off at the bank, she left and went to a nearby 
Albertson's grocery store to purchase cigarettes (T. at 120, 
121). It would seem very illogical that Kogen, who was about to 
commit a robbery, would do so without knowing whether his escape 
car would be around when he left the bank. This again would tend 
to discredit defendant's testimony as to her involvement in the 
crime. 
Third, defendant testified that when she "returned" to 
the bank a few minutes later, she observed defendant "walking 
out" of the bank and did not notice "anything unusual" (i.e. 
wearing disguise of ski goggles or scarf) except that Kogen was 
now carrying a gun, as well as a plastic grocery sack containing 
money (T. at 121-122). Nonetheless, at his direction, she drove 
away (T. at 123). Testimony at trial, contrary to defendant's 
assertion, showed that Kogen "ran" to the car parked twenty to 
thirty yards from the bank, and the car was immediately driven 
away (T. at 40-41, 49-50, 59). Furthermore, there exists no 
independent evidence in the record indicating Kogen removed his 
disguise prior to entering the car other than possibly 
defendant's own testimony. These circumstances again indicate 
that it was defendant's intention or "conscious objective or 
desire" to actively participate in the commission of the crime. 
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Fourth, following the detonation of the "red-dye pack" 
(when, defendant testified, she first became aware of the 
robbery), several actions by defendant (as established by 
eyewitness testimony) were very consistent with a person aiding 
or abetting another in the commission of a crime. After the 
explosion, defendant opened three of the car doors, attempting, 
along with Kogen, to remove the red dye dust (T. at 75-76, 80). 
When the car was stalled, defendant did not attempt to escape, 
but in fact exited "the driver's side of the car, and . . . stood 
there and looked under the hood at him [Kogen] trying to figure 
out what the problem was" (T. at 42-43, 59-60, 69). Upon 
restarting the car, Kogen yelled to defendant "Hey, you — hurry. 
Get in. Get in the car. Hurry before witnesses see us," 
following which defendant entered the passenger side (T. at 62-
63, 76). None of the independent witnesses testified as to any 
force or threats of force. Prior to returning to Kogen's 
residence, the couple stopped at a 7-Eleven convenience store 
where defendant purchased a drink (T. at 125). During this time, 
defendant neither fled from Kogen, nor attempted to contact 
police. 
The above evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, clearly established that defendant possessed the 
requisite intent for commission of the crime of aggravated 
robbery. The jury was not obligated to accept as true 
defendant's version of the facts, and in the present case would 
have been justified in rejecting it. 
The majority of evidence presented at trial tending to 
exculpate defendant consisted of her own testimony. Yet, her 
testimony, as indicated above, was both inconsistent and 
illogical compared with the other evidence presented. In 
addition, the jury would have been justified in rejecting her 
testimony in whole or part as inherently suspect. Defendant 
admitted at trial that she had lied to police during the recorded 
interview following her arrest, concerning the events surrounding 
the commission of the crime and her involvement therein. 
Finally, defendant sets forth the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987), as being 
dispositive of the present issue, but without explanation. In 
Kalisz, the Court reversed a defendant's conviction for 
aggravated robbery on grounds of insufficient evidence. The 
Court noted that the only evidence linking defendant to the crime 
was that defendant provided transportation to and from the scene 
of the robbery. Furthermore, the Court went on to say, 
The State failed to present any evidence 
that placed Kalisz at the scene of the 
robbery or in the getaway car or linked him 
to the crime through possession of any of the 
stolen goods . . . The circumstantial 
evidence connecting Kalisz to Remington and 
the crime is insufficient to prove that 
Kalisz was with Remington during or 
immediately after the robbery and that he had 
the requisite mental state for the crime with 
which he was charged. 
735 P.2d at 61 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to Kalisz, in the present case there is no 
question that defendant was with Kogen immediately prior to and 
after the commission of the aggravated robbery. Furthermore, her 
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intent to commit and/or aid in the commission of the crime was 
clearly established by her conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the jury's guilty verdict. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this M^ day of August, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM 
71-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or willfully"; 
"knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "crim-
inal negligsnoe or ©riminally negligent."—A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature 
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is bit conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when be is aware of the nature of 
bis conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of bis conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(S) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing bis conduct or the result of bis conduct when he is aware of but con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circum-
stances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that ita disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the stsndard 
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of bis conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the cir-
cumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
764J01. Bobbery.—(1) Bobbery is the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in the possession of another from his person, 
or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means of force 
or fear. 
(2) Bobbery is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person commits aggravated 
robbery if in the courts of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, dur-
ing the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
78-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or 
for oonduct of another.—Every person, acting with the mental state re-
quired for the commission of an offense who directly commits ths offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
parson to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally 
liable aa a party for such conduct. 
